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"Or of the [Blog]"t
Paul Horwitz*
"Weblogging will drive a powerful
new form of amateur journalism as mil-
lions of Net users . . . take on the role of
columnist, reporter, analyst and pub-
lisher while fashioning their own per-
sonal broadcasting networks."
-J.D. Lasica'
"Isn't blogging basically for angry,
semi-employed losers who are too untal-





Close to seventy years ago, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes, writing for the Supreme
Court in Lovell v. Griffin,3 noted that
"[t]he liberty of the press is not confined
to newspapers and periodicals. It neces-
sarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets
*.. the press in its historic connotation
comprehends every sort of publication
which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion."4 A mere forty years ago,
Mr. Justice Black added that "[the Con-
stitution specifically selected the press,
which includes not only newspapers,
books and magazines, but also humble
leaflets and circulars, to play an impor-
tant role in the discussion of public af-
fairs."5  Those Justices surely were
looking back to our long tradition of
"lonely pamphleteer[s] "6 for they could
not possibly have foreseen what was com-
ing down the pike.
I am talking, of course, about the rise
of blogs and the blogosphere. 7 We are
witnessing an explosion in the number of
blogs. While the estimated number of
blogs varies greatly, one blog-tracking
site boasts that it is currently tracking
23.1 million sites. s Many of those sites
are moribund, but other blogs are regu-
larly updated. Nor are these blogs all
simply collections of travel photos or di-
ary entries read by only a few friends or
relatives. Many blogs offer up-to-the-
minute reflections on current affairs, and
the most popular of these can receive tens
t Cf Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
* Associate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. Co-blogger on Prawfsblawg, http:l!
prawfsblawg.blogs.com. Thanks to Mike Dorff, Danni Hart, Kelly Horwitz, Sung Hui Kim, and Austen Parrish
for comments on a draft of this paper.
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of thousands of visits per day.9 One sur-
vey suggests that "by the end of 2004[,]
32 million Americans were blog read-
ers."10
Beyond the numbers, we have also
witnessed a growth in the importance
and influence of blogs. Whether or not
their impact has been or will be revolu-
tionary, as some claim," it is certainly
true that blogs have assumed a growing
role in breaking news, or in calling atten-
tion to existing news stories in a way that
may have a significant real-world im-
pact. 12 Although blogs are most often
thought of as supplements to existing
news media, forming a symbiotic rela-
tionship with them,13 the more evangeli-
cal proponents of blogs, and detractors of
the so-called "mainstream media,"14 have
suggested that blogs are in fact displac-
ing traditional forms of gathering and
disseminating the news. 15 Only slightly
more mildly, Richard Posner has written
that blogs pose a "grave[ I challenge to
the journalistic establishment."16 Given
the novelty of the phenomenon, we may
take these claims with a grain of salt.
Still, it is fair to say that blogs bid fair to
unsettle the dominant status of the con-
ventional news media. We might say
that the rise of the blog represents the re-
alization of the full promise of the "lonely
pamphleteer."17
As they mature and are given in-
creasing prominence, blogs are also be-
ginning to face a number of pressing legal
questions.-" What liability should an
anonymous poster face for a defamatory
comment on a blog, and how easy should
it be for a plaintiff to strip that poster of
his anonymity?' 9 What access should a
blogger enjoy to press credentials?2 Are
bloggers entitled to claim either constitu-
tional or statutory privileges to maintain
the confidentiality of sources? 2 Should
they receive the same exemptions that
mainstream media do from election law
requirements?22 Some of these questions
directly implicate constitutional rights,
while others are founded on statutory
privileges; but all of them resound with
broader First Amendment concerns.
It is therefore a good time to think
about the legal status of blogs, and the le-
gal issues they raise. In this contribu-
tion, I want to think specifically about
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause of the First Amendment.
Bloggers and others are already engaged
in an ongoing conversation about
whether some or all bloggers are journal-
ists, and in what sense.2 3 From there, it
is a short step to the questions posed in
this article: Are blogs part of "the press"
for purposes of the Press Clause? Should
we think of them in these terms? If we
do, what legal consequences does this
move carry both for blogs and for the
press - and for our understanding of the
Press Clause itself?
In a sense, these questions might
seem at best quixotic, at worst pointless.
It is now widely accepted that the Press
Clause is about as useful as the vermi-
form appendix. As Frederick Schauer
writes, "existing First Amendment doc-
trine renders the Press Clause redundant
and thus irrelevant, with the institu-
tional press being treated simply as an-
other speaker."2 4  Even those few
perquisites that have attached to the
press, such as the qualified reporter's
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privilege, have lost some of the constitu-
tional moorings that lower courts were
willing to give them in the wake of the
Court's confused ruling in Branzburg v.
Hayes .25 In a recent article, David Ander-
son has suggested that "the demise of the
press as a legally preferred institution,"
whether constitutionally or under stat-
ute, "is quite possible and perhaps even
probable."26 If any heavy lifting in the
protection of blogs is likely to be done, ei-
ther by the Constitution or by legislative
grace, why turn to this unfortunate re-
dundancy of a constitutional provision?
I think there are good reasons to do
so. Thirty years after Justice Stewart
provocatively suggested that "[t]he pub-
lishing business is ... the only organized
private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection, " 27 we have ar-
rived at a moment in which the lines be-
tween old and new media are so blurred
that the very idea of "established news
media"28 may seem antique. But this ar-
ticle will suggest that the second-class
status of the Press Clause should again
nevertheless be open to reexamination.
Thinking about this question in light
of the rise of the blog raises a number of
important issues. The objections that
were advanced in reaction to the initial
push by Justice Stewart and others to
give some meaning to the Press Clause
included, most prominently, the view
that it was just too difficult to define the
press, and that according the press spe-
cial privileges would be an unpardonable
act of constitutional elitism.2 9 If only
some people get to be "the press," how can
we determine who is entitled to claim
that mantle, and how can we justify
granting them special privileges? On the
other hand, if anyone can now be "the
press,"3o won't any "special" protections
simply be watered down to nothing?
These are still difficult questions, and it
is not clear how the addition of blogs to
the mix affects the analysis. But they are
worth asking at this moment, both be-
cause of broader developments in consti-
tutional theory and doctrine 3 1 and
because the rise of blogs may spark new
thoughts about this old debate. The
Press Clause may yet have important
things to tell us about our understanding
of the Constitution and its relationship to
the real world of speech.
What follows is a preliminary look at
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause. I will provide few defini-
tive answers. Rather, this article will ex-
plore several ways that we might think
about the Press Clause, and about the
role of blogs within the Press Clause.
Thinking about the relationship between
blogs and the Press Clause offers an op-
portunity to think anew about the ques-
tions raised by that neglected provision.
It requires us to consider a series of im-
portant distinctions: between the Speech
Clause and the Press Clause; between
the "free press" and "open press" models
of the Press Clause; between being "the
press" and fulfilling the functions of "the
press"; and between thinking of the Press
Clause as a functional protection and
thinking of it in broader institutional
terms. It is on that last note that I will
suggest a possible avenue for thinking
about the Press Clause in the future - al-
though, as we will see, the rise of the blog
may require us to take a different institu-
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tional turn than that recommended by
Justice Stewart in his famous article.
2
II. "Free Press" And "Open
Press"
We might begin looking for illumina-
tion on the future of blogs and the Press
Clause by looking back to our past. Much
has been written on the question of what,
precisely, the Press Clause was meant to
do, and whether it actually signaled that
the framers of the Constitution intended
to provide any meaningful independent
protection for the press.3 3 It is possible
that the Press Clause singled out the
press by name only because it had been
subjected to official restrictions that were
unique to that medium and inapplicable
to individual speakers. 34 Or perhaps the
Framers simply used the terms inter-
changeably, with little thought for any
distinct meaning the Speech and Press
Clauses might hold.
35
Those arguments might not suffice to
settle the question. I think they do not.
In the final analysis, as Professor Nim-
mer wrote, "It is what [the Framers] said,
and not necessarily what they meant,
that in the last analysis may be determi-
native" 3 6 - and what they said was that
speech and press merited separate con-
sideration. Still, looking at the historical
understanding and development of "the
press" may help us think more clearly
about the purposes and uses of the Press
Clause today.
3 7
Recent work in this area may, in fact,
shed some new light on the ways we
think about the Press Clause in the age of
the blog. Drawing on the historical work
of Robert W.T. Martin, 38 some scholars
have discerned two traditions at work in
the history of law and the press in
America.39 One is the idea of a "free
press" - the idea that "the press should
be free of state intervention so as to en-
gage in criticism of government and
thereby defend public liberty."' 0 The
press in this conception should operate as
an independent, autonomous institution
carrying out a "watchdog" function as a
monitor of government. 41 This is essen-
tially the model Justice Stewart drew on
when he argued that the Press Clause
was meant "to create a fourth institution
outside the Government as an additional
check on the three official branches."
42
The other tradition is that of the
"open press." This is the idea that "all in-
dividuals have a right to disseminate
their viewpoints for general considera-
tion."4 3 On this view, a free press means
nothing more than that "all people should
have the opportunity to articulate their
views for popular consideration."44 The
press is not an expert and autonomous
watchdog scrutinizing government ac-
tion. Rather, it is simply a vehicle for the
dissemination of ideas and a forum for
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" de-
bate.
4-
These competing conceptions of "the
press" may cash out in different and in-
teresting ways. Understanding the Press
Clause from the perspective of the "free
press" model leads to a more specific and
specialized understanding of the role of
the press within the Press Clause. It sug-
gests, as Justice Stewart wrote, that the
clause safeguards a uniquely structural
role for the press as a monitor of the con-
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duct of public officials.46 This conception
of the Press Clause could serve as the
source of a richer, more positive set of
protections for the press. To the extent
the press serves a structural role as a
check on the "official branches" of govern-
ment, 47 it is but a small step - though not
an inevitable one4 8 - to argue that the
Press Clause provides some degree of
privileges 49 and immunities- for the
press. At the same time, the free press
model raises the definitional concerns I
have already noted, and gives rise to the
charge that the Constitution should cre-
ate no privileged institutions.51 Moreo-
ver, to the extent that the free press
model is based squarely on the press's
function as a watchdog of government, it
offers little direct basis for institutional
protection of the press when it discusses
issues other than public affairs, such as
sports or entertainment. (The Speech
Clause, of course, could pick up the slack
there; but it would not do so in a way that
is specifically oriented to the press as an
institution.)
The "open press" model avoids these
problems. It is less likely to be limited in
orientation to press discussions of public
affairs; and because the model "conveys
the right to free expression to individu-
als, rather than to an institution,
"5 2 it
does not face the same problems of defini-
tion or elitism. At the same time, the
open press model does not do the same
degree of work that the free press model
potentially could. To the extent that the
free press model simply acknowledges
the right of "all individuals" to "dissemi-
nate their viewpoints," 53 it is unlikely to
say anything about reporters' privileges,
press access, or any other positive rights
of the press. The open press model thus
does seem to invite the charge of earlier
writers on the Press Clause that it risks
becoming redundant in light of the pro-
tections already offered by the Speech
Clause.5 4 Indeed, the open press model
may at times even be suggestive of addi-
tional limits on the press: if one general-
izes from the view that the open press
model historically entailed the willing-
ness of publishers to offer up to the public
any views that were presented to them,55
then the open press model lends support
to the view, rejected thus far by the
Court, that newspapers ought to be re-
quired to make their pages available to a
broad range of contending views, just as
broadcasters may constitutionally be re-
quired to do so.
5 6
A good deal of evidence suggests that
citizens in the founding era would have
understood the "press" protected by the
Press Clause according to something like
the open press model. If by the free press
model we mean something like the model
of an "organized, expert" body capable of
conducting "scrutiny of government,"'
5 7
then few if any of the newspapers extant
during the pre-Revolutionary and Revo-
lutionary periods met these criteria51 Al-
though the press evolved during the
Revolutionary era and afterwards, its
evolution was less toward the develop-
ment of an expert and autonomous insti-
tution than it was in the direction of an
aggressively partisan press, beholden to
the Revolutionary and party interests
each newspaper served.59 The develop-
ment of an understanding of "the press"
more closely aligned with our own
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modern understanding of journalism -
reasonably expert, autonomous, disinter-
ested, governed by professional norms
and dedicated to its watchdog function -
would not occur until the 1830s, at the
earliest, and perhaps as late as the early
20th century. °
So the historical evidence suggests
that the Framers would have thought of
the press primarily in terms of the open
press model. But we must be careful not
to overstate this conclusion. While the
early American press little resembled the
professional watchdog described in Jus-
tice Stewart's article, the Revolutionary
and post-Revolutionary eras did see the
increasing development of norms of jour-
nalistic autonomy and the rise of newspa-
per editors who were "becoming seriously
engaged in political reporting and in
presenting to [their] readership, the citi-
zenry, a systematic account of govern-
ment."61 Even at the outset of this
nation's constitutionalization of press
freedom, in other words, the concept of a
free and institutional press serving a
watchdog function, with all that this con-
cept entails, was in the air.62 It was thus
no accident that the state constitution
adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776 ac-
knowledged both the open press concept
and the free press concept.
63
Taken as a whole, this history sug-
gests that there may indeed be a home for
blogs in the Press Clause, if we view that
provision according to the open press
model.- In their current state, many
blogs resemble in many respects the pas-
sionate, partisan,65 largely amateur and
often anonymous collection of printers
and writers who were at work during the
founding era, and who were memorial-
ized in the Press Clause.66 To the extent
the blogosphere resembles the press of
the founding era, it may then be natural
to suggest that our thoughts concerning
the constitutional status of and protec-
tion for blogs should stem as much from
the Press Clause as from the Speech
Clause. Moreover, we can protect blogs
under an open press model of the Press
Clause without incurring at least some of
the risks that this model entails. In par-
ticular, the nature of blogs obviates the
concern that an open press model may
fuel calls for forced access to another's
"press."67 Given the inexpensive nature
of blogging,68 we can ensure a diversity of
views without having to treat any blog as
a public good that may be forced to offer
space to individuals with contrary views.
Thus, blogs find a natural home in
the open press model of the Press Clause.
We should hesitate before settling on this
model, however, for two related reasons.
First, as I have already suggested, if the
open press model is largely about the pro-
tection of "uninhibited, robust and wide-
open" debate,69 then the Press Clause
does not do anything that the Speech
Clause does not already do; we are back
to the redundancy problem.
Second, however mixed the success of
the advocates of a free press model of the
Press Clause may have been,70 we should
not be too swift to trade in that under-
standing of the Press Clause, with its
more vigorous protection for the new-
sgathering process, for a model that sac-
rifices that vigor for the sake of the
universality of the right.71 The institu-
tional press captured in the free press
Paul Horwitz
model, and in Justice Stewart's argument
for the Press Clause as a structural guar-
antee, continues to fulfill important func-
tions in our society.7 2 Even if that model
has been less than a complete success as
a constitutional argument, it continues to
support arguments in favor of a host of
non-constitutional privileges that the
press enjoys, and which help it to fulfill
its vital newsgathering function. 73 We
ought to be reluctant to trade in this un-
derstanding of the Press Clause too
quickly.74 Our first cut at understanding
the relationship between blogs and the
Press Clause is thus not completely satis-
fying.
III. Blogs, "The Press," and
"Journalism": A Functional
Approach
We have seen that one potential un-
derstanding of the Press Clause is that it
helps to ensure "organized, expert scru-
tiny of government" by granting substan-
tial protection to the press as a sort of
fourth branch of government.7 5 This un-
derstanding of the Press Clause serves an
important social value but is less accom-
modating to the often disorganized and
inexpert nature of blogs. Is there a way
to preserve this socially valuable under-
standing of the Press Clause without
slighting the role that blogs may play
under this provision?
The answer, I think, is yes, and it
raises another distinction drawn by this
article - the distinction between being
"the press" and doing the work of the
press. The usual understanding of "ex-
pert scrutiny of government," and of the
watchdog model more generally, is that it
involves, not a status, but an activity: it
involves skilled newsgathering, inter-
viewing, ferreting out of facts, investiga-
tive reporting - in short, that set of
activities we call "journalism." If that is
so, we should not think of the constitu-
tional status of blogs in terms of a contest
between blogs and the mainstream me-
dia.76 Rather, we might think about the
Press Clause, or various statutes that
protect the press, as offering protection to
certain functions that may be performed
by either blogs or the established institu-
tional press. We could think in terms of
constitutional or non-constitutional pro-
tection for the function of journalism.
7 7
This way of thinking about the Press
Clause assumes that some form of
heightened protection ought to be availa-
ble for individuals or institutions when
they engage in activities that meet some
definition of the practice of journalism.
For example, we might say that an indi-
vidual who "is involved in a process that
is intended to generate and disseminate
truthful information to the public on a
regular basis" is a journalist, and ought
to be able to claim whatever protections
the Press Clause provides for that pro-
cess, or whatever non-constitutional
sources of protection the legislatures or
common law provide for the newsgather-
ing process.7T Or we might conclude that
any person may claim some set of privi-
leges where he or she is engaged in inves-
tigative reporting, gathering news, and
doing so with the present intention to dis-
seminate the news to the public.79
In a variety of ways, this functional
approach to the understanding of those
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protections afforded to "the press,"
whether by the Constitution or by vari-
ous statutes, is already a common feature
in the law. This functional approach is
often quite apparent. For example, a
number of courts have taken a functional
approach when examining claims of con-
stitutional or statutory qualified privilege
by a variety of individuals: a person who
gathered information for personal use
and later decided to use that information
to write a book,80 an investigative re-
porter who deliberately set out to gather
information for a book,"1 and the pro-
ducer of taped commentaries for a 900
number controlled by the World Champi-
onship Wrestling organization.8 2 Legal
academics have proposed a slew of simi-
lar approaches.8 3 And, of course, the
states that have adopted statutory re-
porters' privileges have relied, at least in
part, on functional definitions when
drafting those statutory protections.8 To
these shield statutes we could also add a
variety of federal and state statutes deal-
ing with questions of press access to in-
formation or to government proceedings,
freedom from intrusive searches, and
other privileges or immunities.8 5 But a
functional understanding of the press is
also present in the law in ways that may
be less apparent. Thus, Randall Bezan-
son has argued persuasively that many
courts, when examining the contours of
constitutional protection for the press in
libel cases, have asked whether the press
actor was exercising editorial judgment,
defined as the "independent choice of in-
formation and opinion of current value,
directed to public need, and born of non-
self-interested purposes ."86
Depending on how one defines the
function ofjournalism, this functional un-
derstanding of the Press Clause could ob-
viously protect blogs as well as the more
established and recognized press. A pop-
ular question asked in blogging circles
has been whether blogging is journal-
ism. 87 Often, the answer is a fairly blunt
"no.""" But a functional approach to the
Press Clause suggests that this is just an-
other instance of asking the wrong ques-
tion, 9 or at least of asking it too broadly
and bluntly. It now seems safer to say,
not that all blogs are a form of journal-
ism, or that blogging is never journalism,
but that "some Weblogs are doing jour-
nalism, at least part of the time."90 At the
very least, when a blogger engages in
fact-gathering for purposes of public dis-
semination of newsworthy information,
that blogger can be seen as having en-
gaged in an act of journalism that is wor-
thy of some constitutional or statutory
protection.
A functional understanding of the
Press Clause, or of the myriad statutory
protections that fulfill the potential of the
Press Clause, thus would provide a mea-
sure of protection to blogs when they are
actively engaged in those core activities
that we think of as constituting journal-
ism. The medium by which that journal-
ism is disseminated to the public matters
far less than the fact that an individual
has deliberately gathered and dissemi-
nated newsworthy facts.9 1
Some observations about this ap-
proach are in order. First, it should be
noted that a number of current statutory
protections for journalism partake of in-
stitutional elements that would leave
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blogs unprotected even if they were en-
gaged in journalism.92 For example, Cali-
fornia's shield law requires the person
claiming the protection of the law to be
"connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or
wire service";9 3 and New York's statute
provides protection only to regular em-
ployees of news organizations or those
who are "otherwise professionally affili-
ated for gain or livelihood" with news or-
ganizations.9 4 Leaving aside the difficult
question whether the Press Clause or
some other constitutional provision re-
quires the protection of bloggers, a func-
tional approach certainly recommends
that states reexamine their shield laws
with bloggers in mind, focusing on func-
tion rather than affiliation.
Second, I have assumed that the
functional approach is most relevant for
positive claims that a blogger should be
entitled to the same privileges or immu-
nities - the right not to be compelled to
reveal one's sources, the right to resist
searches, the right of access to govern-
ment records or proceedings, and so forth
- that the traditional press have, in one
way or another, been able to claim. As
such, I have assumed a fairly narrow
compass for the functional approach.
This approach would thus offer little pro-
tection for the primary activity of most
blogs (and many newspapers, for that
matter) - "shaping, filtering, comment-
ing, contextualizing, and disseminating
.. the news reports that others have pro-
duced."95 That does not mean that such
blogs are simply left out in the cold; they
may still rely on the protections offered
by the Speech Clause. But it does sug-
gest that a functional approach would
only protect some of the functions per-
formed by blogs or the established press.
Is the functional approach, then, a
better way of understanding both the
Press Clause and the role of blogs within
the Press Clause? One might think so.
Certainly this approach would protect
much of what is at the core of journalism:
not merely first-person observation, but
the gathering of facts from a variety of
sources for the purposes of public dissem-
ination of important information. And
because it is available to anyone who en-
gages in the function of journalism, and
not simply those individuals who are em-
ployed by recognized and established
news media, this approach gets rid of any
concerns about elitism.
9 6
Nevertheless, we should not be
wholly satisfied with this approach.
First, the functional approach may avoid
one definitional problem - are blogs jour-
nalism? - only to replace it with other,
equally difficult definitional questions:
What is journalism, exactly? And which
aspects of journalism - editorial judg-
ment, newsgathering, or something else -
deserve special protection? It is not
enough to say that "[ilf what the press
does receives sufficient protection, who
the 'institutional press' is becomes unim-
portant";97 that response simply raises
the question of what it is that the press
does that we consider worthy of protec-
tion. Once we decide that certain jour-
nalistic functions merit heightened
protection, whether under the Press
Clause or under a statute, then a defini-
tional problem is simply inevitable. And
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if it was once true that "a court [or a leg-
islature] ha[d] little difficulty knowing a
journalist when it [saw] one,"9g it is safe
to say that adding blogs to the mix com-
plicates the situation considerably. Fur-
thermore, because blogs rarely involve
the kinds of internal controls that govern
in the newsroom - in particular, the re-
straining force of professional norms of
reporting, the presence of layers of edi-
tors, the time for reflection provided by
(usually) non-instantaneous communica-
tion, and the simple cost of establishing a
newspaper or other news medium - there
may be more reasons to worry that blog-
gers will invoke the legal protections
offered to journalists for purely opportu-
nistic reasons.99
These objections should not carry too
much weight. If one believes that the
newsgathering function merits added
protection, the definitional problems and
the threat of opportunism must simply be
counted as part of the inevitable but nec-
essary cost of seeing those additional pro-
tections into being. Nevertheless, even if
one sets these objections aside, some-
thing still seems lacking in the functional
approach. Focusing on function alone
hardly seems to capture all the ways in
which the news media, old or new, con-
tribute to our social discourse. It seems a
thin conception of the ways in which
mainstream media form a part of the
fabric of our social life simply to suggest
that they add some store of new facts to
what we knew already. It does not de-
scribe, in Professor Balkin's words, the
ways in which old media form part of the
ongoing conversation that makes up our
"democratic culture."1° ° And if that is
true of conventional media, it is doubly
true of blogs, whose value consists prima-
rily of their role as "participatory me-
dia,"1°1 and which have quickly estab-
lished their own unique role in our
cultural conversation. A functional ap-
proach to the role of the blogosphere
within the Press Clause does not seem to
engage its real role, which is only secon-
darily about "journalism" and far more
about its status as a "miniature public
sphere of its own."102
A functional approach to the role of
blogs within the Press Clause thus helps
to isolate some of the most socially valua-
ble aspects of the journalistic enterprise,
and to protect those aspects of journalism
in both their online and offline aspects.
But it seems to lack the descriptive power
to capture all the reasons why we value
and protect "the press," old and new. Its
failure to differentiate between the old
and new media has the virtue of protect-
ing both blogs and the traditional press -
but only at the cost of failing to accu-
rately describe the unique features and
promises of each separate institution.
IV. Stewart Redux: A New
Institutional Approach
So I return to the inspiration for the
title of this contribution: Justice Stew-
art's provocative suggestion that we
think of the Press Clause as "a structural
provision of the Constitution" that pro-
tects "the institutional autonomy of the
press." °0 We might conclude after thirty
years that Stewart's institutional vision
of the Press Clause is a non-starter. The
Supreme Court certainly has never
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signed on to anything like a fully fledged
version of Stewart's description of the
Press Clause, and one would think it
would be even more untenable now that
"anyone with a computer or a mobile
phone is a potential reporter and pub-
lisher." 10 4 But despite the assumption
that Justice Stewart's institutional au-
tonomy version of the Press Clause died
aborning, there may be more life in it
than one would expect.
Building in part on Justice Stewart's
foundation, this last section argues in
favor of an institutional vision of the
Press Clause. Notwithstanding the many
criticisms that have been heaped on his
suggestion, 1 5 this section argues that an
institutional understanding of the Press
Clause can be a normatively attractive
approach. Moreover, it is also a more de-
scriptively accurate account of what actu-
ally happens in First Amendment
doctrine than is generally supposed.
Under an institutional approach to the
First Amendment, it is not out of the
question that blogs, despite their evident
variety, can and should find some degree
of protection in the Press Clause as an
autonomous "press" institution in their
own right.
In making this argument, I leave
much open for future discussion. It is
certainly not clear at this point what the
precise scope and nature of the protection
blogs might enjoy under an institutional
approach to the Press Clause would be;
and it is not necessarily the case that
blogs ought to enjoy precisely the same
degree of protection that the established
news media would enjoy in their own
right under an institutional approach to
the Press Clause. Instead, I will argue
that the established press and the blogo-
sphere should each be protected largely
according to the internal norms - evolv-
ing norms, in the case of the blogosphere
- that govern each of these "First Amend-
ment institutions." °6
We might start by stepping back from
the Press Clause and thinking about
First Amendment doctrine more gener-
ally. 107 Frederick Schauer has argued
persuasively that the current state of the
doctrine might be characterized as one of
institutional agnosticism. 10 8  The Su-
preme Court's general reluctance to in-
vest the Press Clause with any content
that might suggest press speakers have
different rights than individual speakers
is but one example. In its Free Exercise
jurisprudence, it has also moved away
from a willingness to privilege religious
conduct against generally applicable gov-
ernment rules. 10 9 More generally, its fo-
cus on content-neutrality and content-
discrimination "has become the corner-
stone of [its] First Amendment jurispru-
dence,"110  and it has applied this
approach and its exceptions without re-
gard, usually, for the specific medium or
context in which the speech at issue oc-
curs."'
There are some good arguments in
favor of an institutionally agnostic ap-
proach.112 But the cost of this approach is
that the Court is obliged to force the com-
plex real world in which speech occurs
onto the Procrustean bed of its First
Amendment doctrine, to draw myriad ex-
ceptions, or simply to distort the existing
doctrine. 1 3 The result is a doctrine that
is rife with "vague definitions, marginally
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(at best) useful three- and four-part tests,
and slippery and hard to apply catego-
ries" - a "not-all-that-bad" doctrine 114
that, at its worst, approaches incoher-
ence. 115
As I have argued elsewhere, we
might take another approach.116 Rather
than build First Amendment doctrine
from the top down, crafting general rules
that apply imperfectly across a range of
situations, the courts might begin with
the recognition that a "number of existing
social institutions" - such as the press,
universities, religious associations, li-
braries, and perhaps others - "serve func-
tions that the First Amendment deems
especially important."" 7 Building on this
foundation, the courts could "construct
First Amendment doctrine in response to
the actual functions and practices" of
those institutions that merit recognition
as "First Amendment institutions. " ' 18
Under this approach, the Court
would identify those institutions that
merit recognition as First Amendment in-
stitutions." 9 Those institutions would
then be granted significant presumptive
autonomy to act, and the courts would de-
fer substantially to actions taken by
those institutions within their respective
spheres of autonomy. The courts might
go further still, and recognize instances
in which the social value served by some
First Amendment institution counsels
privileges or immunities, such as some
degree of protection for reporters' ability
to maintain the confidentiality of their
sources, that might not be available to
other speakers.120 The courts might, in
short, value First Amendment institu-
tions as institutions, and accord them
substantial autonomy to act within that
institutional framework.
To argue for an institutional ap-
proach to the First Amendment is not the
equivalent of an argument in favor of an
absolute constitutional immunity for
First Amendment institutions. That a
First Amendment institution might have
substantial autonomy to act does not
mean it would not be obliged to act within
"constitutionally prescribed limits."121
This approach does entail granting a sub-
stantial degree of self-governance to
those institutions that play a substantial
role in contributing to the world of public
discourse that the First Amendment aims
to promote and preserve. But my point is
precisely that these institutions are al-
ready substantially self-governing insti-
tutions: they operate in accordance with
an often detailed and highly constraining
set of internal norms that govern the
bounds of appropriate behavior within
different First Amendment institutions.
An institutional approach thus sim-
ply suggests that courts should, in the
first instance, defer to those institutions'
capacity for self-governance rather than
attempt to impose an ill-fitting doctrinal
framework based on the idea that one set
of First Amendment rules can and should
apply to the radically different social in-
stitutions in which speech takes place.
To the extent it is necessary to build
some set of "constitutionally prescribed
limits" around the behavior of those insti-
tutions, the courts should build from the
bottom up, taking their cue from the
norms and practices of the institution in
question and from the social values
served by that institution. Thus, the
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court might ask of a First Amendment in-
stitution's action in a particular case, not
whether it comports with some universal
First Amendment rule, but whether it
falls within the boundaries of behavior
broadly consistent with the norms and
practices of that institution, and whether
those norms and practices serve the First
Amendment values that are advanced by
the role of that institution within the
broader society.1
22
A First Amendment doctrine built
from the ground up around the value and
practices of existing "First Amendment
institutions" has a number of qualities
that ought to be normatively attractive.
Not least, it offers a way of thinking
about the First Amendment that actually
responds to the differentiation that is ap-
parent in the real world between differ-
ent kinds of speech institutions - the
different contexts in which speech occurs,
the internalized norms of conduct that
constrain the speakers in each institu-
tion, and the social values served by the
kinds of speech that are central to differ-
ent kinds of institutions.123 It is far more
attuned to the actual speech- and press-
oriented social practices the First
Amendment serves to promote. It thus
avoids the doctrinal incoherence that is
inevitable when courts attempt to fashion
a First Amendment doctrine that tries,
and fails, to be all things to all kinds of
speakers and speech situations.
Moreover, because it is willing to en-
gage in some institutional differentiation
rather than fashion generally applicable
rules, the institutional approach to the
First Amendment may be both better
suited to protecting the full range of
speech and speech-related activities en-
gaged in by different First Amendment
institutions, and more conscious of the
limits of those institutions. In other
words, it may avoid being either overpro-
tective or underprotective of any given in-
stitution. 124  The law of reporters'
privileges may offer one such example.
2 5
Although many lower courts and state
legislatures protect reporters from di-
vulging the identity of their sources, the
Supreme Court could not find a majority
to firmly back this position, in part due to
the "practical and conceptual difficulties"
inherent in the inevitable question
whether particular "categories of news-
men qualified for the privilege."126 This
unwillingness to engage in any institu-
tional differentiation between the press
and other speech institutions may result
in a less vigorous protection for new-
sgathering than is enjoyed in other legal
systems, which have found on both statu-
tory and constitutional grounds that re-
porters are entitled to such a privilege.
12 7
If readers concede that this vision
carries some attractive qualities, the ob-
jection still may be made that urging the
Supreme Court to shift so radically from
its current approach to First Amendment
doctrine is unrealistic. That objection is
unfounded. In various ways, the Court
already acknowledges the unique value of
a variety of traditional speech institu-
tions, the press not least among them.1
2
This tendency is perhaps most apparent
in the cases involving the law of govern-
ment speech, in which the Court has
shaped its doctrine according to whether
the government speaker is acting as a li-
brary,129 a journalist, 30 or an arts
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funder.'3' It is also evident in the Court's
hesitant but clear recognition that uni-
versities operate under principles of aca-
demic freedom that require them to have
some constitutionally grounded auton-
omy to make educational decisions, even
in the face of countervailing constitu-
tional principles such as that of non-dis-
crimination. 132 It is also arguable that
these cases can be seen as part of a
broader trend on the current Court of rec-
ognizing and protecting the autonomy of
a variety of intermediary institutions
that serve a vital social and structural
roles in our society.
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If we think of the First Amendment
in institutional terms, the Press Clause is
obviously the most natural, most textu-
ally rooted place to find some form of in-
stitutional autonomy for what we might
label the conventional working press.
Here, too, we may see some traces of in-
stitutionally oriented thinking in the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the press.
Although it is true that the Court has re-
fused to explicitly grant the press any in-
stitutional autonomy, underneath the
surface the picture is a little different.
Most famously, although a splintered
Court ultimately rejected the claim of a
constitutionally grounded reporter's priv-
ilege in Branzburg, a plurality of the
Court in that case did say, "Nor is it sug-
gested [here] that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protec-
tion; without some protection for seeking
out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated."134 The Court has also re-
peatedly suggested that in evaluating
cases involving the press, it will erect a
sphere of autonomy around the press's
performance of some of its key functions,
such as editing. 35 Finally, although the
protections of New York Times v. Sulli-
van and its progeny may also apply to
non-media speakers,'13 it is clear that the
constitutional rules governing defama-
tion actions involving public figures or
matters of public concern were crafted
with the press in mind. 137 In sum, in a
variety of ways, the Court's treatment of
issues involving the press has both in-
formed and, more importantly, been in-
formed by a series of norms and
principles that emerge from the nature of
the press as an institution.
Linking these findings to the broader
point of this section, we might take from
this discussion the possibility that the
Court could - and should - become more
self-conscious about using the Press
Clause to grant some degree of institu-
tional autonomy to the press. While that
autonomy naturally must be subject to
some set of "constitutionally prescribed
[outer] limits,"138 in shaping those limits
the Court might turn substantially to the
press's own norms of self-governance for
guidance.
This brings us back to blogs, the sub-
ject of this Symposium. In thinking
about the relationship between blogs and
the law, we might take the institutional
approach to the First Amendment as our
starting point. Blogs can be thought of as
a kind of emerging First Amendment in-
stitution. More particularly, they can be
viewed as an especially visible and well-
crystallized example of a broader devel-
oping speech institution: the unique envi-
ronment that is public discourse in
cyberspace.139 Once we think of blogs as
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a First Amendment institution, we might
ask whether the Press Clause, recogniz-
ing the blogosphere as a unique form of
"press," could accord the blogosphere a
similar form of institutional autonomy,
and create some breathing space for the
formation and evolution of this new insti-
tutional form of public discourse.
Conceiving of blogs as a type of First
Amendment institution, entitled to sub-
stantial autonomy as an institution,
raises some difficult questions about the
scope of autonomy blogs should enjoy. In
particular, notwithstanding the disdain
for the professionalized print and broad-
cast press that is so common in the blogo-
sphere,140 there are good reasons to
believe that the institutional structure of
the established news media makes them
better suited for some degree of legally
granted, constitutionally grounded insti-
tutional autonomy than blogs might be.
The established news media typically op-
erate subject to a set of ethical and pro-
fessional norms, made explicit in a host of
ethical codes and, more importantly, ab-
sorbed by individual journalists in a
deeply embedded sense of professional
identity that shapes and constrains their
actions. 141 Indeed, it may be the case that
those internal norms are a far better pre-
dictor of the nature and limits of press
behavior than any norms that could be
imposed from the top down by the
courts. 142 In addition, mainstream news
media are subject to a variety of con-
straints that emerge from the editing
process and the simple fact of their corpo-
rate and hierarchical structure. 143 Blogs,
on the other hand, are written by individ-
uals or small groups, and postings are
typically transmitted without editing and
often without much reflection on the part
of the blogger. Nor are many bloggers en-
amored of the idea of a bloggers' code of
ethics .144
To raise these questions does not
mean that blogs should not receive any
institutional protection under the Press
Clause, however. Rather, these ques-
tions simply lead to the conclusion that
an institutionally differentiated First
Amendment would naturally suggest:
that an institutional approach to blogs
under the Press Clause should attempt to
draw the contours of blogs' institutional
autonomy in a way that is appropriate to
blogs as an institution. On this view, it
would be an error to characterize blogs as
"a new form of journalism,"' 14 and at-
tempt to draw institutional protections
that simply ape whatever institutional
protections the conventional press are en-
titled to. Instead, we should ask what
protections are necessary given the pur-
pose, value, and nature of blogs as an in-
stitution.
If we consider blogs from this institu-
tional perspective, the first thing that is
apparent is that blogs form a collective
institution. Although it may make sense
to think of newspapers as singular, if
similar, entities, it makes less sense to
think of blogs as isolated speech instru-
ments. We might say, grandiosely, that
there are no blogs - there is only the
blogosphere. Blogging ultimately is a col-
lective enterprise, and must be under-
stood as part of the distinctly collective




Once blogs are viewed collectively
rather than individually, there is much to
be said for the idea that blogs do enjoy
the kind of institutional framework that
makes it less dangerous for courts to cede
a considerable degree of autonomy to
them. 147 Typically, we rely on newspa-
pers to correct their own errors; we thus
emphasize, through libel law, the impor-
tance of newspapers' acting according to
the proper institutional norms: reporting
and editing without actual malice, and
with the sound exercise of editorial judg-
ment. 14 Blogs' correction practices are
not singular but collective: errors are ex-
posed and corrected through the exposure
of mistakes and the airing of corrective
views on many, many other blogs. 149 Fur-
thermore, whatever bloggers may say
about not wanting a code of ethics to be
imposed on them, it should be apparent
to anyone who has engaged in sustained
blogging that an organic set of norms and
practices has evolved, and continues to
evolve, in the blogosphere. Bloggers al-
ready seek to conform to a wide variety of
relevant norms: norms in favor of linking
to other sites; norms in favor of linking to
the newspaper article or other source
that forms the subject of, and that sup-
ports (or refutes) the arguments made by,
the blogger in a given post; norms in
favor of correcting or disputing errors
that have been pointed out by others; and
norms in favor of allowing commenters,
who also serve as error-correcting
agents.1 50 Corresponding to these norms
is an evolving set of norms that govern
readers' expectations on the blogosphere:
norms that suggest that certain sites may
be more trustworthy than, others, and
that assertions made on any one site
ought not be completely credited unless
and until they have been verified else-
where.151
In sum, the norms developing in and
around the blogosphere - both bloggers'
norms and readers' norms - suggest the
development of an institutional frame-
work that may collectively do much of the
verification, correction, and trust-estab-
lishing work that established news media
institutions do individually. These con-
clusions lead us to some tentative
thoughts about what an institutional
First Amendment approach to blogs
under the Press Clause might look like.
Certainly it would entail the same as-
sumption I have urged should govern the
treatment of the established press under
the Press Clause: that they should be
given substantial institutional autonomy
by the courts. But the shape of that au-
tonomy, built from the ground up based
on what we know of social discourse in
the blogosphere, might be different.
For example, with respect to defama-
tion law, it might make sense to shape le-
gal doctrine in a way that recognizes the
collective environment in which speech
and the correction of errors takes place in
the blogosphere. I do not mean by this
that individual blogs would be utterly im-
mune from liability for defamation sim-
ply because of the fact that errors might
be corrected elsewhere in the blogo-
sphere. We might, for instance, give
greater or lesser immunity to individual
blogs depending on how much they actu-
ally make use of this collective error-cor-
recting mechanism: the degree to which
they link to the sources they cite, the de-
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gree to which they track back to other
sites, the degree to which they allow com-
mentary, the degree to which they re-
spond to others' efforts to correct them,
the degree to which they actually ac-
knowledge and correct errors, and so
forth.
It is not clear how arguments for
more affirmative rights, such as rights of
access or rights against the compelled
disclosure of sources, should fare under
an institutional First Amendment treat-
ment of blogs. It is obviously impossible
to grant press credentials to every blog
that might request them, for example.
But it is also the case that most blogs still
rely on original reporting supplied prima-
rily by the established news media.152 So
it might be the case that an individual's
claim of constitutional access rights
under the Press Clause would fail on in-
stitutional grounds. For similar reasons,
it is not clear how we should treat blog-
gers' claims of a constitutionally
grounded privilege of nondisclosure of
sources. But the age of the blogger-jour-
nalist is still young, and we should look to
the norms and practices that develop in
considering this question over the long
term.
Would an institutional understand-
ing of blogs' place under the Press Clause
offer any payoff for blogs, or for our un-
derstanding of First Amendment doc-
trine? I think it would. To be sure, much
of the law that would result from an ex-
plicitly institutional approach to the First
Amendment and blogs would resemble
existing First Amendment doctrine. That
has less to do, however, with the suffi-
ciency of existing doctrine, and more to do
with the fact that the existing doctrine al-
ready contorts itself in an effort to re-
spond to the nature and value of different
speech institutions. 153 An institutional
approach would simply permit courts to
do explicitly, transparently, and self-con-
sciously what they already do implicitly
and clumsily.
Moreover, because an institutionally
differentiated understanding of the role
of blogs would not simply attempt to im-
port the law of the established press
wholesale into this very different me-
dium, it would ease the fear that if every-
one is treated as "the press," any rights
granted under the Press Clause will be so
diluted as to be meaningless.1 -4 Rather,
it would be clear that the Press Clause
protects more than one institution, and
that the content of the rights pertaining
to each must vary according to the nature
and practices of each institution. Think-
ing of blogs on an institutional level
would also encourage courts to pay atten-
tion to such issues as blogs' treatment
under the election laws155 and how they
should be treated for purposes of taxa-
tion, 1 56 keeping in mind both the com-
monalities and differences between blogs
and the established press.
Most importantly, an institutional
approach to the treatment of blogs under
the Press Clause would encourage courts
to more self-consciously consider blogs in
context: to give blogs substantial auton-
omy to act, while monitoring the develop-
ment of norms of behavior in the
blogosphere and encouraging blogs to de-
velop rules of conduct that deter the
worst of the social ills that might emerge
from the blogosphere. It would en-
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courage courts to develop a constitutional
law of blogging that allows the relevant
legal norms to emerge from those cul-
tural norms that the blogs develop them-
selves. In this way, our constitutional
law, whether with respect to blogs or
with respect to the press, universities,
and other First Amendment institutions,
will be the product of an organic dialogue
about legal, constitutional, and cultural




In this contribution, I have offered
three ways of looking at the status of
blogs under the Press Clause of the First
Amendment - and, not incidentally, three
ways of looking at the Press Clause itself.
The first approach distinguishes between
the "free press" and "open press" models
of the Press Clause. Following this ap-
proach, if we acknowledge the historical
roots of the open press model in the Press
Clause and revive an open press-oriented
understanding of that clause, would
make room for blogs within the Press
Clause; but it would do so at the cost of
any meaningful content for rights en-
joyed by blogs - or anyone else - under
the Press Clause. The second approach
would focus instead on a functional un-
derstanding of the Press Clause; it would
focus more on doing "journalism" than on
who qualifies as "the press." This ap-
proach may do a better job of protecting
some of the conduct we value most in
journalism, and it would have the added
virtue of protecting that conduct whether
it is undertaken by journalists working
for the established press or by blogger-
journalists. But it raises definitional con-
cerns of its own, and in any event it does
not seem to fully and richly capture all
that we value in either the established
press or the blogosphere.
The third approach - an institutional
understanding of the Press Clause, and of
the First Amendment generally - is per-
haps the most controversial approach. In
some ways, it seems to require us to
make the biggest leap from existing doc-
trine. It requires hard thinking about the
nature of the Press Clause; it requires us
to cede autonomy to private institutions,
a move that many people are sure to re-
sist; and it requires us to do so not only
for the established press alone, but for
new institutions such as blogs and the
blogosphere. In other ways, though, we
might think of the conceptual leap re-
quired here as being not so great in the
final analysis; after all, an institutional
understanding of the Press Clause simply
reflects the lived reality of our speech in-
stitutions.
In many respects, I have argued, the
institutional approach is also the most
promising and intriguing way to think
about the legal status of blogs, and about
the meaning of the Press Clause and the
First Amendment. However different
Justice Stewart's views ultimately may
be from those offered here, and notwith-
standing the fact that he stood at a tem-
poral midpoint between the dimly
remembered "lonely pamphleteer" of our
past 158 and the as-yet-unforeseen rise of
the blogger, Justice Stewart's seminal ar-
ticle on the Press Clause may still carry
important lessons thirty years later.
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